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TO: USNATO

SUBJECT: Statement on SALT TWO

USNATO should promptly circulate the following statement on the first session of SALT TWO to PermReps. Covering letter should reiterate importance of privacy and strict security for NATO consultations on SALT.

Ambassador Farley, Garthoff, and others will be available for NAC meeting week of November 13, preferably November 15 so that PermReps views can be reported to Washington prior to decisions on USDel guidance for first session of SALT TWO. Garthoff will also be prepared to meet with experts following NAC meeting if desired. Ambassador Smith or other senior members of USDel will be available to meet further with Council at outset of first session of SALT TWO.

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S.M. KENY (ACDA/ST)

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

STATEMENT TO THE NAC ON SALT TWO

1. The first session of SALT TWO will begin in Geneva on November 21, and is expected to last about a month. While SALT TWO will build on past achievements, it will also be faced with issues left unresolved by SALT ONE which were put aside on May 20, 1971. During the past several months the U.S. Government has conducted a fresh review of problems involved in negotiating a permanent agreement to replace the /Interim Agreement. This review showed the desirability of having an initial round of explorations, as we did in Helsinki in November-December 1969, and the Soviet Union is in accord with this approach. This procedure will also allow us to consult more fully with the members of the Council before the U.S. comprehensive position for SALT TWO is worked out in the first part of next year.
2. Although final decisions have not been made on the substance of this exploration, it is anticipated that the U.S. Delegation will discuss general objectives of SALT to establish a framework for concrete proposals later and develop with the Soviet Delegation a general work program for subsequent sessions. The only substantive product is expected to be the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

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3. The guidance for our Delegation at this initial round is still in preparation. The following observations set forth somewhat more fully the questions we are now studying, on which the views of members of the Council are invited. Representatives of the Delegation can be present for a discussion at the next Council meeting. Again, at the time of the opening of SALT TWO later this month, when the U.S. approach for the initial round has been established, representatives of the Delegation plan to visit the Council for further briefing and exchange of views.

4. There are four principal aspects for consideration in seeking a treaty on strategic offensive arms: which systems should be limited, how they will be limited, the timing and scope of possible reductions and whether some qualitative constraints will be included.

5. The general U.S. aim is to seek equal aggregates of central systems, including strategic heavy bombers as well as ICBM and SLBM "launchers. Many issues must be dealt with in arriving at such an aggregate. For example, it must be decided to what extent substitution of one system for another would be allowed, and whether some systems. (such as mobile ICBM launchers) would be banned. Consideration is also being given to ways by which reductions in the

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the present disparity in missile "throw-weight" might be defined and negotiated.

6. The Soviets can be expected to raise the issue of our forward-based systems in the discussion of aggregates. The U.S. Delegation does not plan to raise this subject. If the Soviets do, which is all but certain, we would continue to reject a contention that forward-based systems are "strategic." The U.S. will again argue that the U.S. forward-based nuclear delivery systems can not be isolated and dealt with without regard to non-central nuclear delivery forces of the USSR.

7. Based on the results of the explorations, the U.S. may need to consider, in consultation with the members of the Alliance, other ways of dealing with the FBS issue. One possible approach would be treatment of FBS along the lines of the generalized non-circumvention formula discussed in the Council in the spring of 1971. The treaty might, for example, provide that each party would undertake not to

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build up non-limited nuclear delivery systems in a manner which would jeopardize the viability or circumvent the effectiveness of the treaty. Such a formulation would not preclude all increases or shifts of deployments. It would place the burden on a complaining party to show that a given change in deployment threatened to circumvent and jeopardize the treaty. It would therefore not unduly restrict NATO force deployment planning, yet would provide a basis for challenge if the Soviets sought to circumvent the treaty by major increases in systems such as MR/IRBMs or medium bombers

8. In general, the U.S. will stress that FBS issues should not be addressed until limits on central systems have been discussed thoroughly.

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9. The Soviets may argue that they are entitled to compensation in the central-systems aggregates not only for U.S. FBS, but also for the forward basing of U.S. ballistic missile submarines, and for British and French ballistic missile submarines as well. The U.S. Delegation rejected the validity of these considerations put forward by the Soviets in their unilateral statement of May 17/26, and the U.S. plans to maintain this position.

10. A third general area for consideration is the possibility of reductions in the aggregates of central systems. The Preamble of the ABM Treaty declares the intention of the Parties to "take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms." The U.S. is giving careful consideration to the effect of reductions in stabilizing the nuclear balance, for example, by reducing the disparity in missile throw weight. At an earlier stage of SALT the Soviets said it was premature to consider reductions. The U.S. Delegation may wish to explore their current attitude on the timing and scope of possible reductions.

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11. Finally, the U.S. continues to study the possibility of some qualitative limitations which could have importance for strategic stability. Many of these measures raise serious problems of verification and negotiability. There is no indication that the Soviets are yet prepared to accept on-site inspection, and in some cases even on-site inspection might not guarantee compliance. However, the U.S. delegation will probably hold open the question of qualitative limitations for exploration in the following session of SALT TWO:

12. It is possible that the Soviet Delegation may raise the issue of non-transfer of strategic offensive systems during this session. If they do, the U.S. Delegation plans to respond that consideration of this matter should be deferred until the main elements of a strategic offensive arms treaty have been worked out. As the non-transfer question arises in SALT TWO, the U.S. will inform the Council and discuss the matter fully.

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13. The U.S. intends to continue to maintain close contact with the Council on SALT, especially on the issues of FBS and non-transfer. We would welcome any views which members of the Council wish to advance at this time, and will try to respond to any questions that are raised. Representatives of the U.S. Delegation will consult again at the start of the first session in Geneva, at which time the U.S. will be in a position to discuss further its approach to the exploratory phase.

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